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Abstract
A brief retrospective on Boudon’s academic contribution through the three major stages 
of his academic career (path regression models, game theoretical mechanisms and sub-
jective rationality) allows one to retain as his major contribution the proposal of theory 
construction by means of causal intentional mechanisms based on models of strategic 
decision-making. Recurrent structures of cogent systems of preferences formalized in game 
theoretical language seemed to offer him a suitable way to characterize some of the main 
or more significant macro-social effects in terms of micro-decisions taken by individual 
intentional agents.
Keywords: game theory and strategic analysis; rational choice theory; decision-making 
mechanisms; game theory analytical tools; methodological individualism; explanation by 
mechanisms and theory construction; subjective or cognitive rationality.
Resumen. Raymond Boudon: una retrospectiva
Atendiendo a los tres estadios centrales de su carrera (modelos de regresión y análisis de 
sendero, modelos de juegos de estrategia y racionalidad subjetiva), esta breve retrospectiva 
sobre Raymond Boudon pretende señalar como su mayor contribución a la sociología de la 
segunda mitad del siglo xx la propuesta de construcción de teorías de mecanismo intencio-
nal. Formalizadas en lenguaje de juegos de estrategia, un significativo número de estructuras 
recurrentes de preferencias le proporcionaron una forma innovadora de caracterizar efectos 
macrosociales significativos en términos de microdecisiones de agentes intencionales. 
Palabras clave: teoría de juegos y análisis estratégico; teoría de la elección racional; meca-
nismos de toma de decisiones; herramientas analíticas de teoría de juegos; individualismo 
metodológico; explicación por mecanismos y construcción de teoría; racionalidad subjetiva 
o cognitiva.
* A previous version of this paper was published in Mohamed Cherkaoui and Peter Hamilton 
(eds.). Raymond Boudon: a life in sociology. Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2009.
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1. Introduction
If generating social mechanisms as a strategy for theory building is a useful 
tool, then there is no doubt that the work of the French sociologist Raymond 
Boudon has been fundamental for the development of modern sociological 
theory. He was, in fact, a prime example of applying this strategy to complex 
social phenomena and at the time represented a major chapter in the history 
of contemporary analytical sociology. 
As expressed in his constant arguments supporting these possibilities of 
explanation through mechanisms, one outstanding feature of Boudon’s aca-
demic career was his persistent determination to actively maintain both the 
applied and theoretical requirements of sociology, and his tenacious pursuit of 
an empirical and scientific dimension for the discipline. Since his early train-
ing in the École Normale’s tradition, he always showed a strong aversion to 
merely rhetorical, demagogic or manipulative discourse, instead, “admiring and 
emulating the objectivity and clarity of men of science” (Boudon, 1996a: 77). 
It was probably this same critical spirit which led him to Columbia University 
where, for a short time, he worked with Paul Lazarsfeld who he already knew 
through the publication of The Language of Social Research (1955). From this 
point on, regression analysis, secondary analysis and text analysis became a part 
of his academic and professional training, and continued to be a permanent 
feature of his work.
Fluent both in English and German thanks to his work at the universities 
of Columbia and Freiburg, from very early on in his academic life he was in 
direct contact with these two traditions and assimilated their most salient 
features. From the Anglo-Saxon empirical school he learned methodological 
rigour and became interested in regression techniques, statistical control and 
path analysis. Mindful of the limited or scarce possibilities of these statisti-
cal procedures as a means to serious causal analysis, he promptly embraced 
Lazarsfeld’s claim in favour of non-statistic or theoretical assumptions. Fol-
lowing then Herbert Simon’s leading work on asymmetry and causal con-
cepts, he saw in the introduction of intentional mechanisms a secure way to 
overcome shortcomings widely spread in the standard statistical sociological 
research (Lizón, 2006). From the German sociological school, in particular 
from Max Weber, he took the basic notion of an intentional explanation 
that elicits the motives or reasons for an action as principles of meaning as 
well as causes of human agency. Accordingly then, throughout the different 
stages of his own intellectual and academic career, Boudon shaped his own 
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research programme that came to us as a curious intersection between these 
two major traditions.
One of the most impressive aspects of his work was the tenacity with which 
he came to illustrate and exemplify this strategy of explanation through social 
mechanisms in a wide range of areas. Attending either to simple mechanisms 
of cost-benefit (Boudon, 1973), systems of interaction with interdependent 
decisions (Boudon, 1979a), or a more lax notion of subjective or cognitive 
rationality (1992, 1996b) which he promoted as more in accordance with the 
principles of Weberian sociology of action (Boudon, 2003, 2006), the most 
outstanding result of his work was his capacity to integrate and articulate 
numerous macro-effects or social results within the theoretical framework of 
rational action.
Regarding his contributions to analytical sociology in general, one could 
discern at least three clearly defined moments or stages (Hamlin, 2002). In 
the first, Boudon (1965, 1967, 1968) mainly focused on questions regarding 
empirical methodology, factorial analysis, and path models using regression. 
From here onwards, the generation of models as a strategy for interpreting 
statistical structures (Boudon, 1979b) placed him in the wake of Lazarsfeld-
Merton and Simon-Duncan’s thesis of theoretical models to interpret statistical 
structures. This particular course was to bring him in contact with the pioneer-
ing studies of unconventional economists such as Albert Hirschman, Thom-
as Schelling and Mancur Olson, all of them deeply influenced by Herbert 
Simon’s “Models of Men” and his notion of ‘satisficing’ or bounded rationality.
By the end of the 1970s, Boudon had arrived at a conception of social 
science in general, and of sociology in particular, which, to a large degree, 
he shared with the then young Norwegian philosopher Jon Elster (1978). 
Although working along independent lines, they both presented similar pro-
grammes, mainly built on an intentional behaviour model linked to the meth-
odological individualism of rational choice explanatory thesis, and supported 
by game theory analytical tools. In this central stage of his work, Boudon 
(1977, 1979a) focused on the analysis of interactive social patterns, producing 
an indisputable accomplishment regarding his strategy for explaining macro 
or social phenomena by means of intentional interdependent decision-making 
mechanisms. 
Even though he was familiar with the analytical tools of rational decision 
and game theories, from the very outset of his work one can appreciate his 
critical distance from the prevailing economic model. In this respect, he had 
particularly strong reservations regarding the position of the Chicago School 
(Gary Becker and James Coleman) or any claims of ‘economic imperialism’. In 
La Logique du social, Boudon (1979a)1 explicitly set out an alternative version 
of homo sociologicus that, by necessity, required the inclusion of “more com-
plex” assumptions and a conception of an autonomous agent “better adapted 
to sociological thinking”. With this, he clearly aimed to go far beyond the 
1. Quotations are from the Spanish translation, Madrid, Rialp, 1980.
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standard homo economicus’ monist set of motivations, expressively centred on 
the agent’s self interest and utility expectations. His analytical model, a peculiar 
form of ‘methodological intentionalism’ and ‘methodological rationalism’ (Van 
Parijs, 1990: 48), gained theoretical credibility thanks to his major contribu-
tions and achievements, reconstructing major examples from the sociological 
tradition in a continued effort to interpret unintentional lateral macro-effects 
in terms of micro-processes or intentional mechanisms (Boudon 1979a). In 
some way then, his work became one of the most effective and useful respons-
es to Merton’s long unattended claim concerning the possibilities of linking 
research and theory in sociological work. 
2. Boudon’s analytical proposal
By arguing for a change of paradigm, Boudon attempted to achieve an enriched 
version of intentional explanation as the ultimate aim of any sound sociological 
analysis. His programme was based on the thesis that, in order to explain any 
social phenomenon, one has to start from the actions-decisions of intentional 
agents (a clear preference for methodological individualism) confined to inter-
active systems (his predilection for strategic interdependent decision making). 
With this programme in mind, he tried to distance himself from the sociology 
of social causes (Durheim’s ‘social facts’), while leaning towards models of 
intentional interdependent decision (a neo-Weberian approach). 
While distancing himself from the passive homo sociologicus as the result of 
social determinisms (Parsons, 1937) or social roles (Dahrendorff, 1958), his 
essentially interactionist notion of sociology also brought him into conflict 
with the standard notion of ‘parametric rationality’. Thus, his new proposal 
ended up being conceived as a kind of intermediate position between dia-
metrically opposed options, and would culminate in his own vision of an active 
homo sociologicus as the focal point of his analytical and theoretical proposal 
(op.cit.: 223-241). 
Within this paradigm, social phenomena are no longer seen as mere reflec-
tions of society and culture, but rather as the result of the human capacity to 
reason and decide. Consequently, the social facts are to be interpreted as the 
manifest or latent result of actions and decisions of intentional agents that 
interact in socially indexed contexts. Faithful to the Weberian tradition closely 
linked to the notion of autonomous social agents, the proximity to the theory 
of decision making and games seemed particularly suited to his aims. This 
did not necessarily imply that he accepted the assumptions of the economic 
model as is, and its view of human emotions, motivation and behaviour. Far 
from adopting the view of social agents as mere utility maximizers, Boudon 
attempted to describe them by means of a complex set of preferences activated 
throughout the decision-making process within specific strategic, normative 
and cultural contexts. This was how his version of the homo sociologicus came 
to anticipate important corrections and additions to the standard economic 
model. According to him, perhaps the main differences between both concep-
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tions are that, in the former, the agent is taken as being rational in the strict 
sense of ‘objective’ rationality,2 while in the latter this is only the case in a 
peculiar meaning of limited or ‘subjective’ rationality (Boudon, 2003).
In fact, the rational behaviour of individuals is a far cry from being the 
behaviour of a utility maximizer and cannot be automatically reduced to the 
standards of economic rationality. Leaving aside questions related to the natu-
ral limitations of human cognitive and perceptual abilities (Boudon, 1986a, 
1990), within a given interactive context the individual may also find his/her 
elective preferences influenced by the decisions of others; and, more defini-
tively so, by some social basic norms and the inertia of beliefs and values that 
provide a sort of ‘background’ that, by nature, influence them (Searle, 1995, 
Bourdieu, 1980). Thus, Boudon’s final proposal came to be a hypothesis for 
rational behaviour that tended to be a good deal more lax and wide ranging 
than in the prevailing economic model.
Starting from the premise that the motives (or reasons) behind actions 
make them ‘intelligible’ and ‘explain’ them, in a true Weberian sense, he 
incorporated into his programme the unavoidable interpretative or subjective 
moment of the “motives that lead to action”, yet not renouncing the also una-
voidable need to go beyond merely understanding and describing the evidence 
in question. His approach becomes particularly interesting if one takes into 
account that, in certain areas, particularly in post-modern sociology, there has 
been a tendency to substitute any attempt to explain for merely interpreting 
social phenomena3. Clearly, for Boudon the art of interpreting did not grant 
the sociologist of the observance of the scientific requirements regarding expla-
nation. The peculiarity here is the fact that action constitutes its own category 
of facts (Boudon, 1979a: 239) and, consequently, he made use of the empathic 
assumption not only as a criterion applied to the individual to indicate the rea-
sons that ‘justify’ his/her actions, but, also, as a principle for explaining them. 
Thus, motives or reasons contribute to an inevitable interpretative moment, 
and at the same time endow the action with its own explanatory principle 
(1979a: 237-241, 1992: 31).
It is perhaps this demand for explanation which constitutes the most dis-
tinctive feature of Boudon’s ‘neo-Weberian interactionism’, which he used 
to definitively distance himself from the old prejudices of operationalists and 
behaviourists and their systematic exclusion of mental states. However, the 
same demands also allowed him to take distance from the non-causalist herme-
neutic versions, interpretations equally founded on understanding or Verstehen, 
but only in a narrow Diltheian sense, as regarding only subjective intentions 
or meanings. Rather than the motives which specific actors attribute to equally 
2. In an ideal competitive market, individuals are believed to be fully informed and all-know-
ing in the sense that they know the only pertinent information about the prices. Since the 
agent knows all he needs to know, their knowledge is taken to be “objective”.
3. To a large degree, “due to the predominance of this kind of interpretive discourse, sociological 
theory appears to carry less and less weight in empirical research.” (Boudon, 1998: 127).
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specific actions (as found in some merely descriptive ethno-methodological 
exercises), Boudon’s concern was clearly both actionalist and indisputably 
explanatory and theoretical.
3. The appeal of game theory
While game theory hardly had any immediate impact on the empirical theory 
of action followed by the Columbia school, Boudon found himself decisively 
influenced by the logic of games. Paul Lazarsfeld was who introduced these 
mathematical tools as part of the on-going training of the members of his 
Bureau of Applied Social Research. Though his central aim was to improve their 
formal skills, judging by the results, von Neuman and Morgenstern’s theses 
did not seem to have any substantial influence on most of them; although one 
must underline that the lucid essay by Luce and Raiffa (1957) on strategic 
games came out of these seminars. Merton did not mention this possibility 
(in his successive editions of Theory and Social Structure) nor did Coleman 
(the one member of this group who was closest to the rational choice models) 
embrace matrix games in any significant way. Perhaps the main achievement of 
Lazarsfeld’s efforts was to familiarize those fellow sociologists, completely alien 
to the Weberian tradition, with the idea of an explanation based on human 
agency. Following the logic of interdependent decision frameworks, they were 
exposed to alternative hypotheses on human behaviour which could be used 
to substitute their empirical programme focused on ad hoc psychological vari-
ables (as in Stouffer’s epigones), or based on rudimentary functional mecha-
nisms (following Merton). In stark contrast, a very young Boudon clearly saw 
the possibilities offered by the mathematical language of games to provide a 
causal dimension hitherto unknown in sociological statistical practice. In fact, 
its interactive models seemed designed to offer social research the possibility 
of integrating causal reasoning into the analysis of the social interaction of 
autonomous decision-makers.
Lacking a language able to express cause in an efficient way, it is only natu-
ral that statistics did not encourage the idea of a strictly explicative empirical 
sociology (Lizón, 2006). Nevertheless, this would all change radically with the 
introduction of the language of games. Leaving aside the constitutive problems 
that have prevented this applied mathematics from being fully developed, 
matrix games decisively broke down the obstacles to causal thinking imposed 
by the symmetry of statistical correlation. It finally allowed for formally posing 
a basic causal reasoning in matters of social theory and social research (Simon, 
1964).
Given that Boudon always stressed methodological issues, it comes as no 
surprise that he placed emphasis on the use of different matrix games, as they 
provided him with excellent tools to establish causal grounds for some general 
structures of human interaction. These mathematical structures allowed him 
to do so within a logic that presented the social facts as lateral results, often 
not intended, or even contradictory to the intentional actions of intentional 
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interacting agents. Hence, in stark contrast to many of his colleagues, he was 
fully convinced that, by learning to identify relevant structures of preferences 
in crucial matrix games, and using them properly in tasks of description and 
analysis, sociologists could make a solid contribution to the understanding of 
interesting social processes.
In this way, game theory offered him a formal and analytical framework in 
which the ‘rational’, ‘consistent’, ‘non-contradictory, etc. came to be defined 
in terms of interdependent decisions within strategic interaction systems. 
This approach would finally lead him to integrate Popper’s former analysis of 
the logic of the situation and the interdependent decision model into a basic 
scheme (Boudon, 1979a); a reformulation that also allowed him to associate 
this decisional stance with the idea of composition effects or lateral social 
results, now understood in terms of intentional reasons or causes. In merging 
these ideas, he found a general logic that could shed light on the behaviour of 
social actors and, furthermore, do so from a formal framework closely tailored 
to real forms of social interaction.
An immediate consequence of rational strategic behaviour in game theo-
retical terms is its essential interactive or social character. In fact, in this 
particular mathematical language, rationality of choice comes to be described 
in relation to a context of interaction and in strict dependence on the type of 
interactive system in which the decision is made. Effectively, this is a formal 
modality of interdependent decisions that accounts for maximization prob-
lems and strategic equilibrium within systems in which the decision of some 
individuals has a decisive influence on the decision of others. It is probably 
because of this that Boudon ended up stating that “since it is unrealistic to 
try and explain a social phenomenon outside an interactionist model […] 
these systems of interdependence are of particular importance for sociological 
analysis” (1979a: 129).
Once one adopts the framework of rational decision and game analysis 
and begins to experiment with the various matrix games, one of the most sur-
prising outcomes is the potential wealth of its formal tools. In fact, they can 
simulate a wide range of interdependent relations, in which central notions 
such as ‘risk’, ‘agreement’, ‘mediation’, ‘coalition’ or ‘social contract’, etc. come 
to identify different critical structures of preferences, which describe a wide 
frame of empirical arrangements of great interest to social research. The basic 
utility of these formal tools is commonly associated with the fact that, “rather 
than a theory in commonly understood terms”, the logic of interdependent 
decision appears to refer to “an indispensable natural system for understanding 
human interaction” (Elster, 1989: 36)4. Although it has infinite mathemati-
cal possibilities (Schelling, 1984), social scientists should only be concerned 
with identifying a finite number of game matrices that seem to be particularly 
pertinent to questions that directly concern them. 
4. Quotation is from the Spanish translation, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1991.
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4. The meaning of methodological individualism in Boudon’s sociology
Along with the rationality assumption, the explanatory principle of methodo-
logical individualism constitutes for Boudon (1992: 26-31) the other mainstay 
of the sociology of action. In a strictly Weberian sense, methodological indi-
vidualism for him is equivalent to the assumption that social phenomena must 
be explained as the result of individual actions, actions which, in turn, have to 
be explained in terms of those intentional stances which guide the individual 
agents and cause them to undertake them.
In such a case, human actions are to be understood as the set of behaviours 
motivated by ‘significant’ mental states responding to ‘expressed’ motives or 
reasons. Its central relevance is naturally tied to humans’ basic capacity for 
empathic understanding; an innate ability that allows us to ‘look inside’ and 
understand the reasons for our actions, and relate to others by understanding 
the motives behind theirs. It is because of this sort of human endowment as 
natural psychologists (Humphrey, 1986) that the action comes to constitute 
the core of any sound analysis and explanation of human affairs. One must 
not forget that this insight was precisely that which provided Weber with the 
definitive argument to award action a privileged position in scientific social 
explanations. With this it was also implied the consequent need to endow the 
social sciences with a character that was not only intentional, but also, intrinsi-
cally interpretive.
Closely linked to the Weberian tradition, Boudon continuously underlined 
the primacy of intentional regularities. The analytical focus of sociology must 
be on autonomous individuals capable of non-regulated decision making: “The 
causality relation that is observed between the parameters of the interaction 
system and the behaviour of the actors is only intelligible if seen in terms of the 
behaviour of actors endowed with autonomy” (1979a: 35-36). So, as a meth-
odological rule, the sociologist must adopt the consideration of individuals or 
agents as no longer “left to their fate in a social vacuum” (Boudon, 1992: 28), 
but instead included in interactive systems, where the intentional actions come 
to be “the [true] logical atoms of analysis” (Boudon, 1979a: 63). 
All of this is in clear contrast to Durkheim’s collectivist tradition and his 
proposal for structural states as being responsible for social aggregates or ‘social 
facts’. Adopting a completely opposed view, Boudon systematically argued in 
favour of the idea that any correctly established social regularity is to be under-
stood as the result of intentional facts, that is, in terms of human actions and 
human interactions (Boudon, 1986b). Whether the suicide rate remains stable 
or not in the face of different statistical controls – as argued by Durkheim 
(1897) – in the end it is individuals who in fact commit suicide and they do 
so in accordance with ‘their reasons’ (Douglas, 1967). This, if any, is the exact 
meaning Boudon gives to Coleman’s idea of the intentional explanation as a 
‘final explanation’ or explanation with proximate mechanisms and distal causes.
To define social facts from the perspective of game analysis does not only 
mean presenting them as the result of individual intentional actions, but also 
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assuming that these actions are shaped within authentic systems of interde-
pendent decision making (Bunge, 1999: 30)5. On this matter, his proposal also 
ended up distancing itself from the standard methodological individualism of 
parametric rationality, since he clearly opted for a notion of strategic rationality 
that he believed adapted better to sociological analysis. In this way, more than 
a mere analytical tool, games end up making a kind of ontological claim. In 
the end, one would have a theory that prescribes how rational agents behave in 
contexts of interdependence, which is the hypothesis behind Boudon’s (1979a) 
own interactionist paradigm. Thereafter, interactive systems came to be seen 
as the basic molecule of social analysis; in fact, they are the interdependent 
decision systems that incorporate the intentional actions of decision makers.
5. The question of ontological atomism
When it comes to methodological individualism and ontological atomism, 
Boudon appears to have fallen victim to a certain degree of confusion. On 
the one hand, he readily acknowledged the intrinsically interactive or social 
nature of agents as strategic decision makers. On the other, however. he did 
not consider it necessary to revise the ontological assumptions which have tra-
ditionally gone hand in hand with the explanatory thesis of the methodological 
individualism of rational choice. In the end, it is not clear what he really meant 
when he stated that the principle of methodological individualism, “does not 
imply […] a perception of society as a juxtaposition of ‘solitudes calculatrices’. 
It does not convey an atomist image, but rather an interactionist image of society, 
which is clearly very different” (1992: 28, emphasis added). In effect, we do 
not really know if, according to Boudon, we are social because we interact, or, 
from a more profound and essential perspective, we tend to interact precisely 
because we are social. What is argued in this last case is that human distinc-
tive capacities – centrally our capacity for thought and decision – depend in 
a “non-causal but constitutive way” on the enjoyment of social relationships 
(Pettit, 1993),6 and perhaps require being more attentive to our evolutionary 
make up (Lizón and Masjuan in press).
This matter appears to merit attention, even if only to rule it out in a sol-
vent way. Since Boudon (1986a) considers methodological individualism the 
“fruit of a rationalist epistemology” that “only has a methodological status”, 
he believes that the ontological questions linked to this explanatory principle 
must be postponed or ignored as “naïve” and “redundant” issues that “lead 
nowhere”. He is so decidedly in favour of the explanatory principle of meth-
odological individualism that he overlooks the fact that this explanatory thesis 
5. Quotation is from the Spanish translation, México, Ediciones Edaf, 2000.
6. This final interpretation would effectively avoid the Hobbesian idea of a pre-social mind; 
a topic that has now taken on interest not only in scientific circles that sustain a biological 
and evolutionary approach, but also in metaphysics and philosophy of the mind-intention 
where it concerns how significant people’s relationships are in their essential constitution 
as subjects and agents.
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is not bound a priori by any specific ontological claim regarding the nature of 
the human mind and human subjects. In effect, methodological individual-
ism does not constitute a uniform doctrine and, certainly, has no given prior 
commitment to any claims concerning the nature of the mind or the content 
of the mental or intentional states that motivate individuals (Udehn, 2002). 
As can be easily found in any dictionary of philosophy, the term ‘individu-
alism’ designates a doctrine according to which the individual constitutes the 
basis of all structural regularities or social law. Nevertheless, given the elemen-
tary meaning of the ‘individual’ as an ‘atom’ or indivisible unit, individualism 
has always been concerned with at least two distinct and different conceptions. 
On the one hand, there is the definition of the individual in negative terms, 
that is, simply in opposition to any other composed reality (society, commu-
nity, the state, etc.). In contrast, the other tradition has opted to define the 
individual in positive terms as a ‘human individual’, that is, someone in posses-
sion of certain impregnable characteristics and essential capabilities that confers 
the individual a basic ontological possibility to interact socially with others. 
Although in both cases the explanatory principle of individualism is 
opposed to methodological collectivism, the two approaches imply complete-
ly different ontological conceptions. One way of highlighting the difference 
between ontological atomism and methodological individualism would be then 
to clarify that, while the former definition assumes a complete reduction of 
sociology to pre-social Hobbesian psychology, the explanatory thesis of  meth-
odological individualism is also compatible with a richer idea of constitutive 
social – albeit non-causal – human individuals. 
Given the significant differences in interpretation, one has to adopt a clear 
position on this matter, regardless of how open the issue may be. In any case, 
just resting on the assumption that the explanatory principle of methodologi-
cal individualism “has no more basis than its efficacy” (Boudon, 1979a: 65) 
implies a considerable degree of oversight regarding deeply rooted philosophi-
cal and even biological questions. Therefore, by ignoring this issue, Boudon 
succeeded only in obscuring the meaning of his own proposal. Unless one is 
sensitive to the atomistic ontology underlying the standard thesis of the meth-
odological individualism of rational election, it is not possible to avoid some 
of the pitfalls that he himself attributed to Hayek-Popper’s version (Boudon 
1992: 28). Neither can one take for granted that the explanatory principle 
does not imply “conceiving society in terms of a juxtaposition of solitudes 
calculatrices” (Ibidem.) and, at the same time, attempt to offer an alternative 
image of a socially constitutive human mind by the mere fact of undersign-
ing an interactionist scheme. At least not, as is the case here, if one wants 
to criticize in any depth or even go beyond the limitations of the economic 
model (Boudon, 1979a: 224). What is lacking is a more clearly thought out 
and well-informed reconsideration of the ontological assumptions underlying 
the explanatory principle of methodological individualism, which is essential 
to obtain a final fit of the central pieces of his theoretical bet. It is only in this 
way that he could offer more secure and solid arguments in favour of his homo 
Raymond Boudon: A review Papers 2014, 99/4 479
sociologicus, or at least more sound than by making loose statements against 
ontological atomism.
In fact, one of the immediate consequences of the axiomatic basis of neo-
classical economics was precisely the exclusion of social and political moti-
vations. Central notions to sociological analysis such as ‘altruism’, ‘solidar-
ity’, ‘legitimacy’, and ‘social commitment’ are not included in its formalized 
model (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). Yet it is precisely this set of economic 
monist motivations, and not anything else, which Boudon seems to criticize 
responding with the idea of a more complex social agent. If this is the case, 
he certainly cannot limit himself to adopting methodological individualism 
as a mere explanatory thesis with the idea of undermining or transcending 
the explanations based on social facts. He also needs to provide some onto-
logical counterview that would be relevant for his idea of intentional active 
actors, basically autonomous individuals and yet ruled by, and integrated into, 
the historical structures or institutions of their time. By taking distance from 
Hayek and Popper’s economic atomism, he urgently needs a social ontology 
that, though still unsolved, was somehow prefigured in his early proposal of a 
neo-Weberian paradigm. 
Boudon was a long way from dealing with this, but it is very much to his 
merit that he at least posed a question that sociology will have to resolve if 
his active homo sociologicus is to prove to be “alive and well” (Boudon, 1979a: 
224).
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